The email says a confidential deal needs your help. Then the CEO joins a call. The voice sounds familiar. An attorney takes over and explains where to send the money.
That sequence is not just a training scenario. On November 5, an indictment was unsealed in the Southern District of New York involving three people accused of using AI to impersonate executives and attorneys. Prosecutors allege a scheme involving about $129 million. Courthouse News and Associated Press reporting published by ABC News describe phone or video calls using AI to mimic a CEO's voice and sometimes image, followed by an impersonated attorney directing a wire. These are allegations, not findings of guilt. [1][2]
For a small office, the practical question is how to verify an unusual wire transfer request when the person on the call seems familiar. FIX256's recommendation: verify through a separate, trusted contact method before money moves.
How the email, AI call and fake attorney fit together
According to the charging papers as reported by ABC News, the alleged scheme often began with an email to accounting staff, supposedly from the CEO, seeking help with a confidential financial transaction. A phone or video call reinforced the story. The employee was then directed to someone posing as an attorney at a major law firm, who supplied payment instructions. [2]
The important distinction is the live conversation. This is not merely an email asking you to replace a vendor's routing number. Prosecutors describe a coordinated sequence in which a familiar-looking or familiar-sounding executive and a supposed legal professional supported the same false transaction. [1][2]
Our email-driven fraud guide for small law and CPA offices covers the mailbox side. [7] Here, the verification question is who is actually speaking and whether the payment has independent authorization.
Four office rules to use before the next surprise request
The following are FIX256's practical recommendations, not a promise that any procedure eliminates fraud. CISA supports the central callback principle: do not use a suspicious message's phone number or link. Contact the person or company another way, using independently located information or a known contact method. [3][4]
1. A surprise call cannot authorize a payment or bank change
Put the request on hold, even if it appears to come from the owner, managing partner or outside counsel. Apply the same rule to new vendor details and changes to existing payment instructions.
Give staff permission to say: "Our payment procedure requires independent verification. I will call back through our records." Treat that pause as correct procedure, not insubordination.
2. End the call and use a number already on file
For an executive, use the trusted number in your existing HR or payroll records. For a vendor, use the established vendor file. Do not use a replacement number supplied during the call, in the email signature or in the new payment instructions.
If an unfamiliar attorney is introduced, contact the person who supposedly engaged them through your existing records. Do not let the new caller choose the verification route. This is FIX256's application of CISA's independent-contact guidance. [3][4]
3. Require two approvals above a written dollar amount
Choose a threshold appropriate to your office and require two authorized people to approve wires above it. Keep the callback requirement for payment-detail changes regardless of amount.
Have the second approver check the amount, destination and callback record, rather than merely agree that the caller sounded convincing. Write down who can act when the usual approver is unavailable. If nobody authorized can verify the request, hold it.
4. Add a prearranged safe word for genuine emergencies
FIX256 suggests agreeing on a private emergency phrase ahead of time, outside the suspicious conversation. Do not invent one with the person making the request.
Use it as an additional check, never a substitute for the callback or second approval. Do not approve a transfer solely because someone supplies the phrase. The emergency procedure should preserve independent verification, not create a shortcut around it.
Keep the phrase offline or in a place attackers cannot reach through email or chat. If it appears in a message, treat it as compromised and pick a new one offline.
For law and CPA offices, apply the rule to client money too
FIX256 recommends putting trust-account disbursements, client settlement funds, tax-refund routing instructions and vendor ACH changes into the same verification procedure. These are suggested operational safeguards, not statements about a particular professional rule.
These steps do not replace your trust-accounting, escrow, tax, or professional-conduct rules. They are office payment-verification habits only.
Before acting on changed instructions, contact the established client or authorized contact through information already in your records. Ask them to confirm the actual change, not simply whether they sent a message. Record who verified it and who approved the action.
Have your own counsel check how the procedure fits your firm's obligations. A caller's claim to be a lawyer should never be the reason your office skips verification.
What Microsoft 365 MFA does, and what it cannot decide
Keep multifactor authentication enabled. Microsoft documents phishing-resistant authentication options, including FIDO2 security keys and Windows Hello for Business. Ask your IT provider which methods and policies fit your Microsoft 365 environment and licensing. [6]
But separate sign-in protection from payment authorization. In the alleged sequence described above, the employee is persuaded to send the wire. Password theft is not a necessary step in that mechanism. That is an observation about the reported approach, not a claim that investigators ruled out account compromise. [1][2]
Even strong MFA cannot decide whether a conversation's payment instructions are legitimate. Keep independent payment verification alongside account security.
Practice the same hang-up habit with fake IT calls
The Law Society of Alberta's November 5 alert describes attackers impersonating IT support and directing people to fraudulent sign-in pages. It recommends ending uncertain calls and contacting IT through trusted details, and warns against sharing authentication codes or approving MFA prompts you did not initiate. This is Canadian guidance, not a statement of New York rules. [5]
FIX256's practical hang-up tip is the same for IT and money requests: stop the conversation, find your established contact and start a fresh call. Do not let the caller supply the callback number.
Keep recovery planning separate, too. FIX256 recommends a tested restore with written responsibilities. Our guide to making backup and recovery responsibilities clear explains what to agree on before choosing a solution. [8] Do not treat restoring files as a way to reverse a wire.
General information only, not legal advice. Ask your own counsel about your firm's obligations.
Make the callback rule easier to follow
Want to talk through your office's payment-verification habits and account security?
Book a free 20-minute call with FIX256.
Sources
- Erik Uebelacker, "Trio charged with impersonating CEOs using AI to steal millions from top companies", Courthouse News Service, November 5, 2026.
- Associated Press, "3 charged in scheme to use AI to impersonate CEOs and attorneys to steal $129 million", ABC News, November 5, 2026.
- CISA, "Recognize and Report Phishing".
- CISA, "Teach Employees to Avoid Phishing".
- Law Society of Alberta, "Cyber Alert: Canadian Lawyers Targeted by Sophisticated Voice Phishing Attacks", November 5, 2026.
- Microsoft Learn, "Overview of Conditional Access Authentication Strengths".
- FIX256, "How Small Law and CPA Offices Can Reduce Email Fraud".
- FIX256, "Make backup and recovery responsibilities clear".
